

16 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DD/P

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities

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2. The first sixteen pages of this Appendix is background and history taken almost entirely from a paper prepared by the PPC Staff in 1953. There is no need to send any part of this section to the Department of Defense as it does not pertain directly to them.

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6. The section on the [REDACTED] (pages thirty-nine to forty-two) could be given to Defense in toto.

7. The remainder of the report does not concern the Department of Defense.

8. Recommendation:

a. That the Clandestine Services offer no objection to furnishing to General Erskine's office, Department of Defense,

143841-A

6 OF 7 PAGES

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the extracts of Appendix II of the Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities which refer to them.

b. That other sections of the CIA report (DD/S, DD/L, etc.) be extracted and furnished in a similar manner.

c. That CIA officially request the parts of the Department of Defense Task Force Report which refer to this Agency.

d. That after the exchange of information has been made that we sit down with the proper people in Defense and resolve the facts, thus limiting any extensive discussion at OCB, PB, or NSC levels.

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Attachment:

Attached hereto are additional extracts from the DOD report which give a better idea of the scope of this proposed undertaking.

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Distribution:



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Copy 3
- Copy 4
- Copy 5 & 6 of 7
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NOTES TAKEN FROM THE
TASK FORCE REPORT
ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MAY 1955

143841

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ARMY

Page 118: Relationship of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to Other Intelligence Agencies.

"... G-2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of cooperation with the other Agencies in the intelligence community. The only areas of disagreement which currently exist stem from the proscriptions contained in certain directives of the National Security Council. . . ."

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Pages 124, 125, 126 are devoted to the [REDACTED] r.

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Page 137 - Recommendations:

That the NSC revise NSCID 5 to provide for clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the military services consistent with their

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capabilities and statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947.

"^{25X1G} That the implementation of NSCID 13 be extended to permit participation in the Soviet and Satellite ^{25X1G} by the military services and CIA in direct proportion to the capabilities of each."

U. S. NAVY REPORT

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- Page 154: Navy jealous of its prerogatives in intell. field. Several cases cited where CIA duplicated work of primary interest to Navy particularly guided missiles and transportation in Far East.

AIR FORCE

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COVERT OPERATIONS

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- 4 -

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GW

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"Complete lack of info on part of staff at Washington level charged by JCS with staff supervision of and planning for this type of war."

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Page 196: "In the Far East all collectors in Korea, except CIA, are cooperating and the services have a control system for all of their operations. CIA contends that because of requirements of National Security Act of 1947 and Public Law 110 of 1949 it cannot cooperate."

This has to do with system of source control and IAC-D-54 dated July 24, 1952.

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Page 196: All services have much complaint with CIA in failure of CIA to keep Inter-Agency ^{25X1C}  Committee in Washington and field informed of  until long after they had taken place. No complaint when procedures in accordance with existing directives are used.

E&E

Page 197: Long discussion on E&E concerning Air Force and Navy - then - CIA will not reveal assets in field of E&E at this time. States it is unnecessary. Commander 8th Fleet got instructions in sealed envelope to be opened in time of war which would provide instructions for pilot briefings. CIA will not provide info to Navy crews participating in "overflights" -- CIA says why sacrifice all for one or two men. "This is the only firm indication available to the Navy at the Washington level of the possible existence of any CIA assets in this field."

CONCLUSION

Page 203: "There is a need for the establishment of a control registry of clandestine agents in accordance with IAC Dir #54 in order to prevent duplication of payment and false confirmation or information. Action in this respect is being delayed due to Agency reluctance to disclose sources." (p. 196)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Page 204&5: All concerning above, and

"That the NSC review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for E&E and support of guerrilla warfare.

ATOMIC ENERGY

Page 219: Conclusion

No one agency has primary responsibility for collection or production of info in their field.

Page 220: Recommendation:

"That the Central Intelligence Agency, in the exercise of its responsibilities for coordination of the production of national intelligence, pay special attention to the production of atomic energy intelligence."

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"CIA generally has been the least cooperative Agency in these exchange matters and has aroused thereby the greatest dissatisfaction. It is appropriate to note that the CIA representatives apprised of their activities to the extent they are permitted to

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do so. However, because of the restrictions imposed on the use of this information by the recipient, its use is limited. In some areas a few military men were found who were of the opinion that CIA possessed assets and capabilities which, in fact, they did not have.

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This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
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Date 5/5/92
HRP 89-2

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
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